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Throughout Melanesia and many parts of 
the Pacific, systems of government continue to 
be reviewed and restructured. Decentralisation 
of state powers and responsibilities from the 
national to provincial and lower levels of 
government is a recurring theme. The major 
rationale is that it is both more democratic 
and more efficient to locate decision-making 
powers closer to the people. A good deal of 
thought and effort by government planners and 
constitutional “engineers” has gone into central 
- local relations, particularly into the division 
of powers and financial arrangements between 
the two levels. From one country to another the 
resulting models of decentralisation have varied 
considerably.
In all of this effort however, surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to the nature and 
shape of local-level government. In the years 
since independence, it is clear that in many 
Pacific countries local-level institutions have 
decayed and the quality of their governance 
has deteriorated. Now - in light of the 
apparent inability of national governments to 
provide stability, consistent services and good 
governance - the demand for the reform and 
strengthening of government at the local level 
is increasing.
In May 2003, the State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project hosted the 
Local-level Governance in the Pacific Workshop 
at the Australian National University. This 
discussion paper comprises the papers presented 
by two key speakers, Dr Penelope Schoeffel 
and Professor Mark Turner. Taken together 
they provide insights into models, structures 
and processes of local governance and how 
these might be developed in countries where 
governmental systems are under review.
SMALL IS NOT BEAUTIFUL: 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND 
SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE PACIFIC
PENELOPE SCHOEFFEL
About a hundred years ago, in all Pacific 
islands, local level government was all the 
government there was. Those governments were 
rarely responsible for more than a few hundred 
people and comprised a group of around fifteen 
to twenty men representing all the kin groups in 
the village, whose leadership role came to them 
with age and achievement and in some instances 
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inheritance. They were usually centered on 
men’s houses, which were the largest and 
most important buildings in the village and 
were generally avoided by women. Village 
governments had five main functions:
1. To maintain village harmony and 
resolve disputes.
2. To socialise young men, and control 
women.
3. To mediate relations with the 
supernatural.
4. To organise external relations with 
outsiders by negotiating coalitions, 
matrimonial alliances and other forms of 
exchange.
5. To organise defense against attack by 
outsiders, or to plan attacks on them. 
In most parts of the Pacific most of these 
functions have been abandoned to the church 
or the state, but village governments continue 
to operate to a greater or lesser extent. In 
multi-cultural Pacific states such as Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, village governments were formally 
sidelined in government processes, whereas in 
indigenous mono-cultural Pacific nations they 
have generally been incorporated, in modified 
form, into the system of national government 
(Fiji, Samoa, Kiribati, and Tuvalu provide some 
examples). 
Today citizens throughout the Pacific tend 
to be disillusioned with their governments, 
which have failed to meet the high hopes and 
expectations held at independence twenty or 
thirty years ago. 
• Some citizens - those who know about 
it and think it is wrong - are angry about 
corruption, inefficiency and the waste or 
pillaging of national resources. 
• Some citizens are also angry that other 
citizens, perceived as outsiders, have 
migrated into their area and are doing 
better than the local people, or that they 
are using resources or enjoying powers 
that local opinion holds that they have 
no right to. 
• In some countries there is great disparity 
between developed and underdeveloped 
regions and resource-rich and resource-
poor regions. The citizens living in the 
resource rich areas, or the developed 
areas, ask why they should share their 
wealth with the citizens in the poor areas. 
• Most citizens are disappointed and 
angry because of the declining quality 
or availability of government services 
and economic opportunities in rural areas 
compared to the benefits enjoyed by those 
who live and have jobs in towns. “Where 
is our share?” rural people ask and so do 
the urban unemployed. 
So an angry, dissatisfied, disillusioned public 
responds by looking for answers to these 
problems, and the answer that comes is to break 
up the government into smaller regional and 
local units where maybe the benefits will be 
shared more evenly and where more people can 
have more of a say about how the country is 
governed and who gets what. 
While citizens throughout Melanesia are 
calling for governments to be carved up into 
smaller units, many mainstream development 
theorists and aid donors are also calling for 
decentralisation, devolution and participation. 
The theory holds that the closer government is 
to the people it is supposed to serve, the more 
efficient and accountable it is likely to be. The 
smaller the area and number of people served 
by local level government, the better informed 
citizens will be and the more able they will be 
to demand the services they need. In arguing 
for decentralisation, mainstream development 
theory draws a contrast between responsive 
local governments and a remote, uncaring, 
self-serving central government. It argues that 
by decentralising and devolving many of the 
functions of central governments to local 
governments, central governments will become 
smaller and more efficient, concerned with 
maintaining the national system of rules 
and processes, and with specialised functions 
requiring high level expertise. 
This influential agenda arises from another 
mainstream development orthodoxy about the 
need to reform bad governments. The reform 
agenda arises from concerns about cost 
effectiveness and the amount of national and 
donor resources required to support the cost of 
government in developing countries. Further, it 
is argued that the private sector is stifled by 
the intrusions of the state into every sphere 
of activity. The underlying question is this: 
How can a poor country grow and develop 
when the lion’s share of resources are going to 
a dysfunctional government, while the private 
sector, that should be generating economic 
growth, is languishing? The answer, into which 
much faith, effort and aid is currently invested, 
is the standard recipe for reform, which has 
three main ingredients. 
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4. Fundamental changes are needed 
before government can achieve 
development goals at any level.
5. Local government can be strengthened 
without much devolution of state powers 
to smaller geographical units.
6. To improve conditions at the local 
level, the priority must be to strengthen 
and improve the efficiency of centralised 
national bureaucracies.
The conditions that create the governance 
problems at the top are the same lower down, 
so the same problems occur.
Throughout the Pacific, the public sector has 
been used as a means of wealth distribution 
and job-creation and in many countries it 
is organised in ways that allow politicians 
excessive powers of intervention. This is the 
crux of the governance problems that beset so 
many countries in the region (see Schoeffel 
1997/8).
Many Pacific island countries have serious 
problems with corruption, associated with 
collusion between politicians and bureaucrats 
involving the misuse of public funds and other 
resources. The collusion of the bureaucracy in 
corrupt practices - or their active initiation 
of such practices - is entangled with systems 
of patronage. Lower down the ranks, petty 
corruption and inefficiency is often encouraged 
by miserable working and housing conditions, 
sometimes erratic wage and salary payments, 
chaotic management practices, and general 
demoralisation.
In most Pacific Island countries, patronage 
and corruption are fed to a large extent by 
the cultural attitudes of voters. Political support 
is attracted and elections tend to be won by 
those who can demonstrate power to attract and 
amass wealth and to share it in some form or 
another with supporters or clients, in a modern 
enactment of older political processes. Even well 
educated and principled would-be politicians 
must stifle any ethical qualms they may have 
about the expectations of their electorates in 
order to recoup the costs of their campaigns. 
Donors have knowingly or unknowingly 
colluded with official corruption by turning a 
blind eye to the systematic abuses that beset 
many aid projects because of the geopolitical 
agenda that underlies aid. Hughes (2003) cites 
economic theory that aid creates pernicious 
economic distortions and perverse incentives 
and argues for the elimination of aid, claiming 
that this would force governments to adopt 
First, reduce public expenditure by reducing 
the size of government. This includes cutting 
jobs, privatising state-owned enterprises, 
contracting out government services, abolishing 
government subsidies and all other state 
mechanisms that, as Mr. Grass Roots would put 
it, encourage lurking and perking.
Second, encourage better performance of 
civil servants by subjecting them to corporate 
mechanisms and market forces and pressures.
Third, initiate a program of devolution of 
powers to regional and local governments who 
must answer to the electorates that, being closer 
and thus better informed, will demand and 
receive accountability and better governance. 
Services will be more appropriately targeted, 
because officials must answer to their clients. 
In culturally diverse countries, local perspectives 
and local knowledge can be brought to bear on 
government to make services more cost-effective 
and to overcome the problems of one-for-all 
policies.
NGO development agencies, although they 
tend to vigorously oppose mainstream 
development theory and donor approaches 
to development, also strongly advocate 
de-centralisation and devolution. This is not 
just because they are critical and suspicious of 
central governments, which they are - and 
often with good reason, but also because they 
espouse a counter theory of development. They 
argue that real development is people-centered 
and can only occur through transformative 
local-level social action based on community 
empowerment and participation involving the 
poor and excluded - and women. The counter 
theory holds that only self-generated local-level 
development is truly sustainable. Therefore 
decentralisation and the devolution of the 
powers of government to smaller units 
representing communities is essential to the 
achievement of the alternative vision.
So, if we have the disgruntled citizens of 
many Pacific Island states, powerful donors and 
influential NGOs united in faith about the 
merits of decentralisation and devolution, who 
would dare challenge these ideas? This paper 
discusses six sceptical propositions:
1. The conditions that create governance 
problems at the top are the same lower 
down, so the same problems occur.
2. Cutting the pie up into smaller pieces 
doesn’t make the pie any bigger.
3. People often don’t want what is good 
for them.
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rational economic policies and rational use 
of resources. However, the governments that 
provide bilateral aid and the multilateral donor 
and finance institutions (which must answer 
to aid-giving governments) fear that countries 
with dysfunctional government may further 
disintegrate if aid is cut. Further, there are 
humanitarian concerns for the poor majority 
who lack basic services in Melanesian countries. 
Donors are responding to the declining 
capacity of governments in PNG, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu to provide basic services, 
by funding ‘community’ driven development 
programs which bypass government and provide 
funds through ‘community-based organisations’. 
At best, this strategy sidesteps the central 
problem of governance capacity and has the 
unfortunate side effect of further weakening 
public faith in government. At worst, such 
programs, by providing resources open to 
capture, may inadvertently feed petty 
warlordism. 
Cutting the pie up into smaller pieces doesn’t 
make the pie any bigger.
From the earliest colonial period, out 
of geographical necessity, all Pacific island 
countries have had decentralised government 
operations. When the provision of social 
services was added from the 1950s onwards, 
operations became more expensive because 
government services had to be channeled 
through several administrative layers in order 
to serve scattered populations divided by sea, 
rivers and mountains, where there are few 
roads and limited transport services. But these 
decentralised operations were tightly centrally 
controlled and run on slim budgets before 
independence. 
Most, if not all, Pacific island countries 
were ill-prepared for independence. Colonial 
governments were not required to build national 
institutions and when the need for them to do 
so was realised it was too late. Even twenty or 
thirty years after independence there are still 
shortages of people with technical skills who 
are qualified and willing to provide services 
at provincial and lower levels. At the same 
time Pacific island countries have suffered 
many economic set-backs. Some are the 
result of external events, but some are self-
inflicted and are a direct consequence of the 
declining capability of governments. In a vicious 
circle, state revenues are declining, so capacity 
continues to decline. 
There are widespread grievances in 
Melanesian electorates. Voters may become 
exasperated with central governments because 
the government in their province works better 
than at the centre, or because provincial-level 
government doesn’t work. In both cases the 
electorate suspects that resources are being 
diverted by central government and this feeds 
demands for further devolution or secession. 
However, because poor governance is systemic, 
the devolution of state responsibilities - and 
aid projects - to smaller geographical units is 
unlikely to provide solutions. These frustrations 
are usually accompanied by a very poor 
understanding of where the State gets its money 
which feeds the belief that local control will 
solve the problem of poor government services.
The locally perceived solution to these 
problems is to devolve the powers and functions 
of the State to smaller geographical units via 
a federal system (currently seen as the solution 
to the crisis of government in Solomon Islands, 
for example) or to clamor for secession (as is 
currently happening in the more developed East 
New Britain province of PNG). Is the national 
government not perceived to be working well? 
Then devolve powers and responsibilities to 
provinces or states, creating another layer of 
politicians. That’s not working? Devolve further 
to local governments and ‘communities’. None 
of that works? Lets try and get our man 
elected so he will get to the source of the 
wealth and share it with us, his supporters. 
Such putative solutions inevitably increase the 
cost of government and the demands on aid 
donors. The cost of setting up smaller units of 
government will mean that there is less money 
to provide basic services to rural populations and 
this will lead to further decline. But even if 
this money was there to be passed down, would 
services improve? This brings me to my third 
proposition:
People don’t always want what is good for them.
There is a strong belief in donor circles, 
mainstream and NGO alike, that if you give 
communities more choices about development 
services and more say over expenditure they 
will make choices that are in their own 
collective best interest. This view seems to 
overestimate the wisdom of the users or “clients” 
of public services. If there are major structural 
weaknesses in the public service and local-level 
organisations, where is the evidence that greater 
consultation with local level institutions and 
greater local participation in decision-making 
makes a difference?
Most village governments in the Pacific 
are based on what sociologists have called 
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“traditional authority” which often conflicts 
with the modern legal kind of authority which 
is needed to promote the idea of public good 
and give priority to local-level service delivery. 
Traditional authority is all about personal power, 
and those who have it can use it to reward 
their supporters and deprive, or punish their 
opponents. In contrast, legal authority is not 
based on the person, but on the offices that 
are held by government employees. The offices 
define and enforce rules about what they should 
and should not do, not the office holders. 
Ideally, this kind of authority exists within a 
bureaucracy based on a legal system with the 
power to resist arbitrary political interference. 
Village leaders who rely on the traditional 
kind of authority don’t necessarily have much 
interest in the kinds of development that are 
good for people, they are more attuned to what 
people want than what they need. Preventative 
health is a good example of this. Most of 
the illnesses that people in the Pacific suffer 
from are preventable, but people tend to resist 
prevention and demand cures. In Australia, we 
read in the papers and hear on TV that most of 
us are overweight and that this makes us sick; we 
need to exercise and change our eating habits, 
but we don’t want to. We do, however, want 
the government to give us free miracle drugs, 
coronary bypasses and organ transplants when 
we need them. 
Similarly, in the Indian villages I worked 
in earlier this year people were much more 
interested in building religious shrines than 
digging drains to prevent the chronic diseases 
that afflicted them. In a small district of 
Indonesia where I stayed a few years ago an 
influx of wealth from migrant workers was spent 
on television sets, not on the water connections 
and lavatories people needed to improve their 
health. In several Pacific island countries where 
I examined the causes of failed water supply 
services (e.g. Schoeffel 1995), no one was 
willing to pay for repairing and maintaining 
their water supply system. They wanted the 
government or aid donors to fix the problem. In 
Samoa, unless the central government organises 
the free collection of rubbish, people continue 
to throw their rubbish in the sea and kill the 
fish, despite public awareness campaigns. 
There is much talk of civil society and 
‘social capital’, but civil society is too often seen 
as development and issue-and-advocacy NGOs, 
which in the Pacific are usually urban 
based, transient in nature due to their 
reliance of charismatic leadership and heavily 
dependent on external donor funds. NGOs have 
benefited greatly from donor disillusionment 
with government and have proliferated in 
response to orthodox development theories. 
Some NGOs are run by people with a 
background in the churches, but most of them 
are run by former public servants. And, despite 
some anti government rhetoric on the part of 
some, most NGOs are subject to many of the 
same weaknesses found in government. Yet, 
if we look at the organisational affiliations 
of most Pacific Island citizens, the most 
institutionalised and sustainable Pacific NGOs 
are the churches which are closely linked to 
voluntary associations at village level such as 
the village councils, and women’s and youth 
groups. The churches in most countries have 
no difficulty siphoning large sums of money to 
finance their own operations and expansion, 
money that is voluntarily given by the citizens 
of Pacific countries. What is being done to get 
the churches interested in good governance and 
local-level development? Do they have a role? 
This brings me to proposition number four:
Fundamental changes are needed before 
government can achieve development goals at 
any level.
Without viable institutions development 
programs can only be ad hoc. Where do we 
see models of local government in the Pacific 
that are not beset with many of the problems 
that are found at the top? In most countries, 
local government works as well as national 
government and if there is so-called ‘community 
development’ in villages it is fortuitous or aid-
driven and not the result of strong national 
institutions that operate consistently in all areas. 
To give an example of the problem, a few 
years ago I evaluated an NGO health project in 
Sepik Province, PNG. The project was to provide 
village-level services, a task which had been 
abandoned by the provincial health department 
which was able only to deliver services, after a 
fashion, at the provincial centre and a few sub-
centres. About 90 per cent of the people in the 
province live in rural villages, but everywhere my 
team and I went we saw that aid posts had fallen 
down, there was no medicine, no preventative 
health measures were being practiced, there 
was no safe water in most places, most people 
had chronic illnesses, the mortality rates among 
young people were high, the schools were 
dilapidated, lacked teaching resources and were 
infrequently attended by the teachers and pupils. 
Crimes, including murders, were being settled in 
the traditional manner, which often gave rise to 
more crimes and murders.
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One village, far away up a small tributary 
of the Sepik River, stood out, however. It was 
clean, orderly and peaceful. It had a functioning 
public water tank, latrines, a well kept men’s 
house and church, neatly mown public spaces 
and clean well maintained houses. The aid post 
had fallen down, but the villagers had re-built it 
and stocked it with medical supplies delivered by 
the NGO. The village looked after the primary 
teacher in the nearby school, which encouraged 
him to do his job. So why was this such an 
exceptional case? The leader of this unusual 
village was an elderly charismatic individual, a 
retired government aid-post orderly, motivated 
by religious belief. He called himself the 
‘council’, although the local government system 
in the area was not functioning and he received 
no pay. No doubt there were active leaders in 
all the villages we went to, but developing their 
villages in the ways I have just described was not 
their priority. 
The province was a text book example 
of institutional failure. Local government and 
services in the area had almost completely 
collapsed. (I know this because I worked in 
the area as a volunteer 36 years ago when the 
local government system operated under both 
local and colonial officials and the health and 
education services, though basic, were run under 
government-contract by the Catholic mission.) 
Now, where health services are provided at 
all in rural areas, the province depends on 
an externally funded, foreign managed agency 
working outside government to provide village 
people with basic health services. The collapse 
of government services occurred because of the 
lack of an institutionalised management system, 
motivated staff and provision of funds for local 
services. The problems were compounded by 
a general lack of maintenance leading to the 
disintegration of roads and government property. 
The resources needed to provide and maintain 
rural services had been sucked up by the 
provincial government in the provincial center, 
and by another layer of predatory politicians. 
All too often, as my example illustrates, where 
there has been devolution of bureaucratic and 
political authority the cost of government has 
increased but not its effectiveness. 
Local government in the province followed 
a model in which councils formed the bottom 
level of a three tier system of administration, 
but this system did not reach directly to 
village level and was thus less institutionalised 
in people’s lives (see May, 1999). This raises 
my next proposition; that village government 
can be strengthened without creating a local 
government system of mini-bureaucracies and 
elected councilors.
Local government can be strengthened without 
much devolution of state powers to smaller 
geographical units.
In multicultural Melanesia, colonial 
administrations appointed intermediaries 
between the village and the colonial state and 
later allowed villagers to elect local government 
representatives, but village governments were 
not formally recognised in most cases. New 
structures were created for administrative 
efficiency, based where possible on culture areas, 
and these typically encompassed large areas 
and numbers of villages, and involved the 
establishment of small local level bureaucracies 
for tax collection and enforcement of local 
regulations. In contrast, most monocultural 
Pacific island countries have local government 
systems based on neo-traditional village 
councils. These operate with minimal 
devolution of state powers, as in the case of 
Samoa’s two-tier system. 
In Samoa, between 1914-1962, the New 
Zealand colonial administration decided what 
citizens needed and made every village 
government accountable for enforcing the rules 
they devised. Village councils had to make 
people pen up their pigs, bury their dead in 
cemeteries, guard water sources to keep them 
pure, clean the village monthly and inspect 
houses to remove insect and rodent breeding 
places. From the late 1940s, the councils had to 
construct simple school buildings and houses for 
teachers, provide food for locally based teachers, 
doctors and nurses, provide labour for public 
works and raise money for water supply systems.
The councils are democratic. Villages 
typically have populations of between 200-500 
people. Every village family elects its chief, and 
every chief has a seat in the village council 
where, regardless of traditional rank, all have 
an equal say.1 In the old days, groups of 
village councils elected representatives (Faipule) 
to the Legislative assembly. It was a one-way 
system at first; the Legislative assembly made 
the decisions and village councils made sure 
they were obeyed. Today, in a country of 
170,000 people, the system and the country 
have changed a lot. Now everyone over 21 
may vote for their parliamentary representatives, 
so to compensate the village chiefs for the 
loss of their exclusive electoral privileges, the 
councils were given limited powers to make 
village by-laws. The relevant Act clearly defines 
the powers of village councils. 
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Savai’i and is paid an honorarium by the central 
government. 
The essential function of village councils 
is to maintain local order in the sense of 
preventing criminal offenses as far as possible; 
to liaise with, and where appropriate to support, 
the local level operations of government 
agencies; and to make their villages aware 
of state policies. The monthly meetings of 
Pulenu’u and the meeting agenda are organised 
by the Ministry of Home Affairs Meetings and 
the meetings are attended as appropriate by 
representatives of line departments who want 
to share information. The meetings facilitate a 
two-way consultative process on state services 
and other matters of concern at village and 
district levels (Figure 1). 
Many of the old village rules, including some 
really useful ones, have now been abandoned 
because they were unpopular and many council 
functions have been modified or handed 
over to the central government. However, 
village councils are still the major agency for 
the dissemination of government policy and 
represent every household in the country, urban 
and rural alike. They have no support staff 
and no fixed state financial allocations, except 
occasional small grants for special purposes such 
as maintaining village access roads; nor do they 
collect taxes, although they can levy small 
fines, mainly in kind. Each council elects a 
representative (Pulenu’u) who attends monthly 
meetings held on the main islands of Upolu and 
Figure 1. Structure of Local Government in Samoa
S&T 03 21/11/03, 2:07 PM6-7
  State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
8
I have spent time on this example to 
illustrate that there is no reason why fairly 
effective village-based government should 
require the devolution of central state powers 
to finance and manage the provision of local 
level services. Of course, Samoa is smaller 
(population 170,000) and more compact than 
any Melanesian country, so it is easier to manage 
a system like this, but this system worked 
back in the 1940s and before, when there 
were virtually no roads or modern forms of 
communications. 
In this model, from time to time, there are 
still abuses of the limited powers given to local 
governments, some of which are checked by 
the justice system. Other abuses, such as the 
practice of school committees paying themselves 
meeting attendance fees (which are paid out 
of school fees and impoverish local schools), 
remain unchecked, as does occasional misuse by 
the members of village councils of government 
grants for village development. The very fact 
that abuses do occur, even within the very 
limited scope of powers given to village councils, 
argues against any further devolution of state 
power to local level bodies. 
This brings me to my final point, which 
concerns the nature of those fundamental 
changes needed before government can achieve 
development goals at any level.
To improve conditions at the local level, the 
top priority should be to strengthen centralised 
national bureaucracies.
States succeed or fail on the capabilities of 
their bureaucratic systems and poor developing 
countries will face even greater problems in 
the future if they are subjected to fashionable 
agendas to roll back the state by shrinking it, 
while at the same time trying to devolve many 
of its functions. 
In a policy environment in the Pacific in 
which public sector down-sizing agendas are 
being promoted, is bureaucratic reform which 
aims to build performance and inspire employees 
possible? Are there any success stories from 
which we may learn? My observations of public 
sector reform programs in Vanuatu, Tonga, 
Samoa and Federated States of Micronesia 
suggest that they have been based on very 
superficial prior studies and one-size-fits-all 
agendas. There has been too much emphasis on 
pushing through macroeconomic policy reforms 
which threaten powerful interests who then try 
to obstruct them. But there has not been enough 
sustained effort to strengthen the performance 
and morale of the public service so that 
government departments may lead the charge in 
promoting policy reforms.
In Tonga, for example, the public sector 
reform process was thwarted from its inception 
by an all-powerful and self-interested cabinet. 
But, in neighbouring Samoa, public sector 
reforms won praise because Cabinet and 
senior bureaucrats considered that they were 
setting the agenda together. The Vanuatu 
Comprehensive Reform Program put some 
interesting experiments in place – even though 
the program was disrupted by too many donors 
pushing competing or conflicting agendas and 
too little political continuity. One experiment 
was to place “super-secretaries” over the 
directors of groups of government departments 
whose role was to deal with Ministers and 
minimise their interference in departmental 
operations.
Judith Tendler (1998) argues, from the 
analysis of case studies of successful local-level 
service programs in the poorest region of Brazil, 
that development and governance theories are 
based on too many untested assumptions and are 
over-influenced by models of poor government 
performance. She suggests that more may be 
learned by looking at what works in developing 
countries. Further, she argues that development 
practitioners ought to be paying more attention 
to the literature on industrial performance 
and workplace transformation, which has many 
lessons for reforming state bureaucracies and 
motivating public employees. 
Improvements in local government in all of 
Tendler’s case studies resulted from “a three-way 
dynamic between local government, civil society 
and an active central government”. In each 
case an effective public sector worked flexibly 
to achieve clearly defined objectives for the 
public good, interacting with civil society 
(local civic associations) where appropriate 
for the task at hand. Paradoxically, effective 
decentralisation was shown to demand more, not 
less centralisation and increased management 
capacity, together with sophisticated political 
skills at the national level (Tendler 
1998:143-5).2
Pritchett and Woolcock (2002) note that 
poverty reduction depends in large measure 
upon effective delivery of core public services 
but that there is widespread disillusionment after 
many failed attempts to create standardised, 
centralised civil service bureaucracies in poor 
countries. They point to an array of alternative 
participatory and “bottom up” approaches now 
debated in development circles and conclude 
that while all have worked in certain contexts, 
all have problematic aspects and none provide 
universal solutions. Their conclusions are 
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not dissimilar to those of the authors of 
the forthcoming World Development Report 
2004, who express reservations about bypassing 
government with alternative mechanisms aimed 
at achieving improvement in the delivery 
of public services. It concludes that donors 
need to pay more attention to the problems 
inherent in service reform, to strengthen rather 
than circumvent critical relationships among 
policymakers, providers and clients; and, in 
aid dependent countries, support institutions 
by evaluating innovations and linking support 
to service delivery with a focus on outcomes 
and results. Wherever possible, the Report 
recommends, aid should be integrated with 
national development strategies, budgets and 
service delivery systems. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has expressed scepticism about 
the long-term viability, in the face of growing 
government failure in PNG, Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu, of devolving state responsibilities 
to smaller geographical units (including 
‘communities’). What is needed is a two pronged 
aid focus on the problem by donors. First, 
efforts to reform and strengthen the civil 
service should be pursued, despite the 
difficulties, frustrations and past failures, as 
a long-term program using staffing assistance 
where necessary and employing carrot and stick 
mechanisms wherever possible. Public service 
reform and strengthening activities should be 
preceded by careful study and analysis of 
the issues and problems to be addressed. 
Efforts should be made to devise performance 
incentives and ways of protecting the civil 
service from political interference. Renewed 
attention should be paid to improving the 
key functions of government; the collection 
of revenues, management of public finance, 
and delivery of key health, education and law 
enforcement services to the public. Secondly 
and simultaneously, efforts should be made to 
encourage civic awareness and responsibility. 
This might best be done by encouraging 
systematic village-level representation that feeds 
into the process of government service delivery. 
Village councils should have limited, legally 
defined responsibilities to assist with the 
provision of government services and to monitor 
and report on the outcomes of government 
services and the performance of government 
employees. History demonstrates that a state 
that is responsive to the needs of its citizens 
and accountable to them is the only proven 
mechanism for sustainable development. 
ENDNOTES
1  The Samoans call it the matai system. Matai 
are ‘chiefs’ or titled representatives of extended 
families. It is thought of as ‘traditional’ but in fact 
developed over the past century since the adoption 
of the Christian religion
2  Tendler is quoting Rudolf Hommes, an ex-minister 
of state from Colombia
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ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF 
DECENTRALISATION
MARK TURNER
Decentralisation is a development strategy that 
has gained universal popularity in recent years. 
It is not, however, a new strategy and it has 
a ‘chequered history’ (Stren 2002). In colonial 
times, the authorities sometimes introduced local 
governments as tools for democratic socialisation 
but more frequently they deconcentrated authority 
to field officers. Post-independent governments 
also experimented with decentralisation in the 
1970s and into the 1980s when it was described as 
the ‘latest fashion in development administration’ 
(Conyers 1983). Shortage of finance, a reluctance 
New Guinea, which had introduced a system 
of provincial government in 1977, amended the 
legislation in 1995, ostensibly to devolve powers 
further to local-level governments (May and 
Regan with Ley 1997).
There are two basic sources for the 
arguments used to justify decentralisation. First, 
there are political arguments which focus on 
democratisation and enhanced participation of 
citizens in making decisions which affect their 
lives. Decentralisation can even be equated 
with human rights. A more pragmatic political 
approach is that decentralisation can be useful 
for creating and maintaining political stability. 
Secondly, decentralisation is promoted on 
technical efficiency grounds. In this view, local 
government is seen to possess managerial and 
economic advantages in providing the services 
people need and want in an efficient and 
responsive manner. Such pro-decentralisation 
arguments are often linked to the notion 
of good governance which has been strongly 
advocated by multilateral and bilateral donors. 
For example, the World Bank (1993) sees 
good governance as involving efficient public 
sector management, an effective system of 
accountability, the rule of law, and improved 
availability of information and transparency 
in decision-making. In theory these desirable 
qualities are associated with a decentralised 
system of participatory governance. 
The Benefits of Decentralisation
Decentralisation has been credited with the 
potential to provide an impressive range of benefits. 
For example, Rondinelli (1981) cites fourteen 
specific benefits that accrue from decentralisation 
while Smith (1993) offers nine. On the managerial 
side these benefits usually include:
Accessibility of officials: officials are 
available for consultation, advice and 
complaint. As local officials can exercise 
decentralised authority, they make the 
decisions and do not need to pass them up 
the line to distant central offices. 
Mobilisation of local resources: it is easier 
for locally based officials to identify 
local resources, both human and physical, 
and then mobilise them in the pursuit 
of locally determined developmental 
purposes. Officials should also be familiar 
with specific local constraints and the 
dynamics of local politics.
Rapid response to local needs: officials are 
better placed to respond rapidly to local 
needs as they are resident in the territory 
and fully aware of local conditions.
Orientation to the specific local needs: 
because officials know the local 
conditions they are well placed to make 
decisions and allocate resources which fit 
with the specific conditions prevailing in 
a particular territory. Each subnational 
territory may have unique features which 
can be taken into account when planning 
and allocating resources.
Motivation of field personnel: appointed 
government officials are more motivated 
to perform well when they have greater 
responsibility for programs they manage.
 Inter-office coordination: coordination 
between offices dealing with different 
functions is more easily achieved at the 
local level where officials are physically 
close together and are often familiar with 
each other.
Central agencies: the decentralisation of 
service functions relieves central agencies 
of routine tasks. Responsibility for these 
has been passed down to the local 
level. Central agencies can thus focus 
on improving the quality of policy. 
Monitoring local-level performance and 
providing assistance to subnational units 
are key elements of this reformulated 
central government role.
From a political perspective the major 
benefit of democratic decentralisation is 
enhanced participation. People are able to 
influence decisions on matters that directly 
affect them. Smith (1985) has identified a 
range of additional political gains which can be 
derived from democratic decentralisation. These 
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include political education, training in political 
leadership, political stability, political equality, 
accountability and responsiveness.
However, implementation of decentralisation 
has often disappointed (Turner 1999). Local 
elites may capture the benefits while poor people 
see no welfare gains. The latter’s voice may still 
be inaudible to officials. Parochialism may be 
inadvertently promoted while spatial inequities 
can be exacerbated. Local management and 
technical capacities may be insufficient for new 
responsibilities. Finance may also be inadequate 
to cover the costs of decentralised functions. 
Central agencies may be reluctant to support 
decentralisation and try to claw back authority 
and resources. In some instances, weak and 
collapsing states are unable to sustain a coherent 
system of government spanning national and 
subnational levels.
While it is impossible to eliminate negative 
experiences from decentralisation initiatives, it 
is possible to reduce them. Uncertainty can 
be lessened by paying greater attention to the 
design process. The World Bank (1999, 107) 
agrees in its pronouncement that ‘the success 
of decentralisation depends on its design’. 
However, it should be appreciated that initial 
designs are not necessarily the final products. 
The implementation of decentralisation raises 
new issues and involves renewed political 
competition over how the planned arrangements 
will actually work. Nevertheless, a well-
considered initial design does go a long way 
towards achieving success. There is a set 
of fundamental questions which designers 
should consider when embarking on a mission 
to reengineer the prevailing system of central-
local relations. If these questions are not 
thought through properly then the chances 
of decentralisation success are considerably 
reduced. The questions are set out below. 
The Design Issues
What sort of design process is required?
The traditional model of the policy process 
is linear. There is a logical succession of stages 
starting at the agenda phase, moving through 
the decision phase and on to implementation 
(Thomas and Grindle 1990). This is orderly and 
neat, but it does not reflect reality. In practice, 
the policy process is messy and politicised. A 
realistic policy process accommodates flexibility. 
It recognises that environments are turbulent, 
that situations change and that stakeholders 
enter and exit the process in unpredictable 
ways. It is useful to adopt the rational linear 
model of the policy process as a rough guide 
to the policy process, but it must not be 
mistaken for reality. First, it is too rigid for the 
unpredictable environments which characterise 
many developing countries. Secondly, it assumes 
rationality in the policy process when political 
considerations are frequently more important 
than technical matters. Thirdly, it does not 
include enough appreciation of risk analysis. 
An embedded element of the policy process 
should be the anticipation of failure. That is, 
participants must constantly ask the question, 
what could go wrong? This helps to identify 
problems and devise ways of overcoming them. 
Such risk analysis is an essential part of 
any policy-making process on decentralisation. 
Ideally, the planning arrangements for 
decentralisation should involve feedback from a 
range of stakeholders. The advantage of such a 
consultative process is that it is inclusive and 
seeks to take account of everybody’s views. The 
disadvantages are that it may be time-consuming 
and could reach deadlock if there are opposed 
views and no agreed method of determining 
their relative merit.
What is the purpose of decentralisation?
This is the most basic but most ignored 
question concerning decentralisation. All too 
often there is inadequate consideration of what 
governments and citizens expect when authority 
is delegated from the centre. If the purpose of 
decentralisation is not spelled out there is the 
danger that it will come to mean all things 
to all people. High but unrealistic expectations 
will be generated. When decentralisation fails 
to satisfy all these expectations, popular support 
is likely to decline and political squabbling will 
take over. Appointed officials will lose interest 
and failure is likely. This scenario can be 
avoided by asking and answering basic questions 
at the outset and publishing the results in 
a White Paper or similar document that is 
widely available and subject to debate among 
multiple stakeholders. Fundamental questions 
on decentralisation would include asking 
whether democratisation and participation are 
the most important goals or whether improved 
service delivery is the principal objective. 
Perhaps national unity is a major concern. 
Equity and balanced development may be 
seen as desirable characteristics. Whether local 
governments are to be important service 
providers or mainly concerned with interest 
articulation is another critical issue that 
requires clarification from the outset. When 
the purpose of decentralisation has been 
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clearly established and communicated widely 
the business of detailed planning can begin. 
Modest expectations should be encouraged as 
the benefits of decentralisation may not be 
immediate. Where the state is weak this is 
particularly important as in such circumstances 
the state has limited capability to introduce and 
sustain new arrangements for local governance.
What are the territorial divisions?
Local level governance requires the division 
of the state’s territory into areas. These are 
the local government areas. In many instances 
there will be a hierarchy of subnational 
units. For example, in the Philippines there 
are provinces and cities, municipalities and 
barangays (communities). In Indonesia there 
are provinces, regencies and cities, sub-districts 
and villages. In small compact states such as 
Singapore there may be no local government 
territories. In nearby Melanesia, Vanuatu is 
divided into 6 provinces. Each province is 
further divided into Local Area Councils, 
with urban areas such as Luganville and Port 
Vila being governed by municipal councils. 
In Papua New Guinea there are provincial 
governments and local governments as well as 
district administrative structures (corresponding 
to national electorates) in between these two 
levels. 
Smith (1993, 18) has suggested five criteria 
for defining subnational territories:
Settlement patterns, where social geography 
suggests political or administrative 
boundaries
Efficiency, when areas are defined 
according to assumptions about the scale 
of operations necessary for optimum 
performance;
Managerial, when an area is defined 
according to the management structure of 
the decentralised organisation;
Technical, where the optimum area for a 
government activity is topographical or 
economic;
Symbolic, where areas define themselves 
regardless of administrative rationality.
How much attention is paid to the division 
of territory into subnational units varies 
between countries. Sometimes there is historical 
inertia and states simply maintain the status 
quo by continuing with old, often colonial, 
divisions. In other cases culture rather than 
technical considerations will strongly influence 
the delineation of boundaries. However, when 
moving from efficiency criteria to symbolic 
or cultural determinants of local government 
boundaries there should be consideration of 
whether such territories are sustainable. An issue 
of particular importance is whether they can 
perform the functions devolved to them. With 
small territorial divisions, whatever the basis of 
their boundaries, there are diseconomies of scale 
which result in inefficient service provision. 
However, there may be political dividends from 
using cultural boundaries and diseconomies of 
scale could be dealt with through alternative 
mechanisms.
The delineation of boundaries also impacts 
on other decentralisation design issues. First, 
there should be consideration of the equity 
implications. Subnational territories will have 
different economic profiles and varying revenue-
raising capacity. This means thought must 
be given to fiscal arrangements, specifically 
whether there should be mechanisms to boost 
the budgets of poor territories. Experience shows 
that there will be strong opposition to radical 
plans for fiscal redistribution. A second factor 
concerns the size of a territory’s population 
and the implications of this for politics. Some 
evidence suggests that larger populations are 
likely to elect candidates with broader appeal 
whereas the smaller the constituency the lower 
the turnout for elections and the greater the 
likelihood that narrow interests will be elected. 
Whether such observations are applicable to 
Melanesia requires empirical demonstration 
(though comparative examination of provincial/
regional and open electorates in Papua New 
Guinea suggests that it holds there). Thirdly, 
there needs to be a risk assessment of whether 
the boundaries are popularly acceptable. 
Boundary disputes can be debilitating and 
distract attention from service delivery and 
welfare improvement. A final issue is whether 
there should be strict guidelines for the 
formation of new subnational divisions. For 
example, in the Philippines financial, 
geographical and demographic specifications are 
set down in law relating to the establishment 
of a new subnational territory at each level. 
This reduces the ability of power-holders to 
reorganise subnational boundaries according to 
their personal preferences and interests.
Do you have to choose one type of decentralisation?
Decentralisation comes in various shapes 
and sizes. For example, the World Bank 
recognises political, administrative, fiscal and 
market decentralisation and further subdivides 
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the administrative type into deconcentration, 
delegation and devolution (Rondinelli 1999). 
However, decentralisation design is not a 
matter of choosing one type of decentralisation, 
although one kind may dominate. The varieties 
of decentralisation allow mixtures of central-
local relations. For example, Cambodia has 
recently commenced a program of devolution 
and deconcentration (Turner 2002). Elected 
commune councils have been established for the 
purpose of interest articulation and to plan 
and implement minor public works. Service 
delivery is being decentralised through 
deconcentration by line ministries. Each 
ministry determines the nature and speed of 
its deconcentration program. The advantage 
of planning decentralisation as a mixture of 
types is that it should encourage efficiency. 
Different decentralisation arrangements are 
chosen according to their perceived efficacy to 
accomplish particular tasks. A danger is that a 
highly complex system emerges when simplicity 
should be the desirable characteristic. 
What are the institutions of local governance?
The foci of decentralised local-level 
governance are the institutions established 
to make decisions and allocate resources. In 
most contemporary cases decentralisation means 
devolution, and this entails some form of 
elected council. For example, in the Philippines 
all persons over 18 years are entitled to 
vote for leaders and councillors at the 
community, municipal and provincial level. For 
such political decentralisation several sets of 
interrelated questions must be addressed in the 
design. The first concerns the electoral system. 
Decisions need to be made on who votes 
and how often, whether first-past-the-post or 
proportional representation is appropriate and 
what should be the qualifications for candidacy. 
There may be a need to include sectoral 
representation and traditional leadership. 
Designers might also wish to consider how 
to broaden political recruitment to include 
marginalised groups. Whether the chief 
executive should be drawn from the ranks 
of councillors or elected separately is another 
important matter. Certainly, more attention 
should be given to leadership recruitment than 
has often been the case in the past.
The procedures of elected assemblies are 
extremely important. Ensuring transparency, 
clearly delineating the extent of authority and 
ensuring an appropriate distribution of authority 
between executive and council are typical 
design concerns which have a strong bearing 
on the efficacy of the local policy process. 
Questions also arise about how much of the 
detail of council procedures should be specified 
in legislation. Should councils have the latitude 
to determine the way they operate? This would 
accommodate differences between subnational 
territories and in weak states will probably be 
the reality regardless of what official documents 
state. The advantage of standardisation is that 
it should provide clear advice to both elected 
representatives and their constituencies about 
how local level government should be run and 
what are the limits of elected officials’ powers.
Institutional design is not confined to 
elected bodies, it also concerns public 
administration. Even deconcentration is 
supposed to facilitate greater participation, 
improved responsiveness and enhanced 
mobilisation of resources. Such attributes do 
not occur automatically but must be encouraged 
and engineered. It is a fallacy to believe that 
giving authority to appointed officials at the 
local level necessarily provides participatory 
and technical benefits. If officials lack skills, 
have poor relationships with the centre, 
command few resources and are imbued with 
‘normal professionalism’ then deconcentration 
will provide few gains for the local population. 
What functions are being decentralised?
Determination of what functions are to be 
decentralised is one of the most important 
issues involved in decentralisation. In Indonesia, 
Law 22/1999 decentralised all service delivery 
functions from education and health through 
to agriculture and environment to the district 
level. Radical decentralisation on such a massive 
scale was feasible in Indonesia where adequate 
technical capacity existed in many regions 
and where funding for existing operations was 
guaranteed. The Indonesian example highlights 
several important design matters. First, there 
is no point decentralising functions for which 
there is inadequate capacity either in terms of 
human resources or physical assets. This leads to 
service breakdown. Secondly, functions need to 
be matched with finance. If local government 
institutions are to provide specific services then 
it is essential that there are funds to pay for 
them. This is a simple but often overlooked 
matter. Thirdly, thought should be given to 
whether it is government which should perform 
the decentralised functions. Are NGOs, the 
church or private businesses better equipped to 
provide particular services? Fourth, there should 
be consideration of how much freedom of choice 
is given to local government units as to their 
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resource allocation for particular services. Can 
they stop providing a particular service if people 
think it unimportant? What mandate would 
a local government need to reduce funding 
on health or education? Alternatively, should 
higher levels of government impose performance 
measures for particular activities? Should they 
prescribe minimum levels of funding and 
performance standards? If so, what courses of 
action will be taken when local governments fail 
to reach the recommended levels? 
What is the timeframe for decentralisation?
Changes in central-local relations can be 
determined and implemented according to 
different timeframes. At one extreme is the ‘big 
bang’ approach in which everything is done at 
once. If there are many changes involved in 
the initiative then big bangs carry many risks. 
Indonesia adopted an approach near the big 
bang end of the continuum. The laws were 
drawn up and implemented in under two years 
for a program involving the devolution of 
numerous functions to districts and the transfer 
of 2.4 million public servants from central 
to local control. By contrast, the Cambodian 
government has adopted an incremental 
approach in which ministries determine the 
content and pace of their deconcentration 
programs and elected commune councils are 
starting with very small budgets and limited 
activities. The idea is that a decentralised 
system of governance will evolve over the 
next decade. The crucial temporal issues are 
to judge the urgency of the need for changes 
in central-local relations and to relate that to 
the capacity of institutions to implement the 
changes effectively. Even where changes are 
urgently needed because service delivery has 
collapsed, the capacity to undertake the desired 
changes may be lacking. Moving rapidly to 
introduce comprehensive transformations in 
such circumstances will bring certain failure.
How much participation is needed for effective 
decentralisation?
Participation is viewed as one of the 
major objectives of decentralisation. Indeed, 
participation and decentralisation are frequently 
portrayed as enjoying a ‘symbiotic relationship’ 
(Seddon 1999, 15). Successful decentralisation 
is seen to require participation while 
participation is believed to be enhanced by 
decentralisation. Participation is usually judged 
to be a good in itself and also as the key to many 
desirable developmental outcomes. It is held to 
empower, give voice to the poor, and improve 
management efficiency. But decentralisation 
designers are faced with a choice of participation 
possibilities (Chambers 1993 and 1997; World 
Bank 1996; Nelson and Wright 1995). Elections 
are a basic participatory institution, but there 
are also such things as community forums, 
participatory rural appraisal, participatory 
budgeting, consultative councils and people’s 
organisations. There are traditional forms 
of community consultation and action, new 
initiatives and hybrids. Everybody, from 
multilateral aid agencies through to 
communities, seems to be in favour of enhanced 
participation, but in Melanesia there has been 
much disappointment with a variety of forms of 
participation.
The designers of decentralisation must 
address several key interrelated issues on 
participation. There is the question of how 
much participation. Should participation be an 
integral aspect of all decision-making? What 
organisational forms should be encouraged and 
developed? A critical consideration is which 
organisations and institutions have legitimacy 
both in the eyes of the community and of the 
state. This relates to whether the recognised 
participatory forms are weaker or stronger. Some 
modes of participation provide little voice to 
communities and disadvantaged sectors while 
at the other end of the spectrum there are 
self-mobilising forms of participation which 
are based on community initiatives (Pretty 
1995). When determining what forms of 
participation are appropriate and will work it is 
important to maintain a focus on the purpose 
of decentralisation and what participation is 
supposed to achieve. What decisions are being 
influenced? For example, if participation is 
supposed to enhance service delivery and 
managerial efficiency then it is important 
to demonstrate why particular modes of 
participation are appropriate. It may be that 
there needs to be a division between 
participation where interest articulation is 
dominant and participation which determines 
the allocation of resources. Communities and 
governments will need to reach accommodation 
on such matters.
A final note on participation is a warning. 
If managed badly, participation leads to conflict 
or decision-making gridlock. Organisations, 
factions or other groups may become 
disenchanted with the participatory process 
and opt out or simply try to disrupt it. 
It should be recognised from the outset 
that communities have not only developed 
mechanisms for cooperative action they also 
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generate oppositions and competition which 
can be debilitating in terms of decision-making 
and communal action. There is a long 
history of development interventions which 
utilise an idealised notion of community 
instead of researching the reality of community 
power structures and the relations between 
communities and external agencies. 
What financial arrangements should be put in 
place?
Financial arrangements lie at the core 
of decentralisation design. The key issue is 
to match finance with function. Subnational 
governments need to secure the level of 
funds necessary to cover agreed expenditures 
on decentralised functions. This ideally entails 
some precision in describing the decentralised 
functions and the level of performance that is 
expected. For example, what are the minimum 
standards for staffing and running a health 
centre? How many books per student should 
there be in primary schools? While a complex 
system of performance measurement is not 
desirable some indication of performance 
standards is most useful for ensuring that a given 
level of service is provided and for promoting 
accountability. Systems of accountability are 
also vital to prevent funds from being 
squandered or diverted to satisfy private ends.
The source of funding is an important 
factor. In Melanesia, the capacity of subnational 
governments to raise substantial sums from local 
taxes is severely circumscribed. The economies 
of many subnational territories do not present 
much opportunity for taxation. Thus, central 
government transfers will be the major source 
of income for most subnational governments. 
The degree of control over these funds is of 
interest to the designers of decentralisation. For 
example, should the system involve earmarking 
specific amounts to particular sectors or 
activities? Alternatively, should there be block 
grants and local-level autonomy in expenditure 
allocation? In such cases what systems of 
accountability need to be put in place to ensure 
communities receive value for money. If local-
level government is not directly responsible 
for the provision of major services such 
as education, health and public works then 
financial flows to local-level governments 
will be greatly diminished thus potentially 
making local-level financial management a 
simpler exercise. This could be desirable 
where capacities in financial management are 
limited and where powerful local leaders can 
alter agreed expenditure patterns to suit their 
personal interests. But for many Melanesians the 
local-level issues in financial management are 
less about management and more about whether 
any funds at all reach the grassroots.
What provisions are there for accountability?
Accountability has become a buzzword 
among decentralisation designers. It is no 
longer simply a matter of satisfying central 
governments that money has been received and 
that expenditures have been made, although this 
would mark a considerable advance in some 
Melanesian cases. Accountability should be seen 
as serving three purposes:
The first is to control abuse of and misuse 
of public authority. The second is to 
provide assurance in respect to the use of 
public resources and the adherence to the 
law and public service values. The third 
is to encourage and promote learning 
in pursuit of continuous improvement 
in governance and public management 
(Aucoin and Heintzman 2000, 45).
Decentralisation design should try to satisfy 
all three purposes. The importance attached 
to each purpose may vary with context 
but all should be considered. Accountability 
mechanisms such as transparent decision-
making or concern with outputs and outcomes 
can simultaneously satisfy multiple purposes. 
There should be efforts to ensure that 
accountability devices combine simplicity with 
effectiveness. For example, sophisticated systems 
of performance measurement are likely to 
break down. Systems consisting of a few 
well-chosen and widely known measures have 
better chances of success. It is an area in 
which community should certainly participate 
but central government also has a role. 
There are numerous examples of accountability 
institutions (Hayllar 1991; Goetz and Jenkins 
2001). The objective for decentralisation design 
should be to choose and modify a few devices 
which have authority and are likely to be 
effective in the context of Melanesian societies. 
Traditional institutions may be particularly 
useful in this regard, not necessarily in their 
pristine states but in forms modified to suit the 
demands of the modern world.
What are the equity implications of decentralisation?
A risk in decentralisation is that it can 
enhance the possibility of inequity between 
different subnational jurisdictions. This will 
depend on the functions decentralised, the local 
organisational capacity, financial arrangements, 
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and the level of, and potential for, economic 
development. If decentralisation entrenches 
existing patterns of unequal resource allocation 
there is likely to be a tendency towards 
increasing inequality between subnational 
territories and perhaps within them. Central 
government has a particularly important role to 
play in attempting to ensure that disadvantaged 
regions receive special assistance. If leaders 
and followers in such regions feel neglected, 
then political discontent and disorder are 
more easily fomented. However, a policy of 
putting extra resources into poor territories can 
meet opposition from wealthier ones which 
feel little or no obligation to support their 
poorer neighbours. Political skills are needed to 
negotiate a compromise in which the interests 
of equity are served and the claims of wealthier 
territories are addressed. If questions of equity 
are not properly addressed then secession and 
state collapse are extreme scenarios which can 
no longer be overlooked.
 
What are the inter-governmental arrangements?
Decentralisation is not simply about giving 
out authority, finance and functions to lower-
level territories. It is essentially about how 
different levels of government will share the 
tasks of government and how societal actors at 
each level can contribute to overall governance. 
Decentralisation is above all a cooperative 
venture. This means that engineering the 
appropriate inter-governmental relations is of 
great importance. It is unfortunately an area 
that has frequently been neglected in 
decentralisation design. Of particular concern 
is the role of central government in a new 
decentralised order. While it is relieved of 
responsibility for various functions it must 
fulfil more complex requirements. A monitoring 
role is essential as is ensuring compliance in 
particular activities, such as finance. Central 
government should also be a facilitator, 
providing both policy and technical assistance. 
Too often central government fails to perform 
any of these tasks efficiently, thus leaving weak 
local-level governments to fend for themselves. 
It may even allow powerful local leaders to 
hijack political positions for personal gain. The 
key to effective inter-governmental relations is 
to specify the procedures for supervision and 
control for each function decentralised. Some 
of these may be bundled for administrative 
convenience while similar procedures may 
apply to many different functions. They 
must be set within ‘a wider network of 
relationships between levels of government’ 
(Smith 1993, 61). Designers should follow 
the principle of simplicity as far as possible 
in determining inter-governmental relations, 
as excessive bureaucratic regulations will 
undoubtedly result in a malfunctioning system 
and may even offer enhanced opportunities for 
corruption.
What training is there for officials?
Organisational capacity is a leading concern 
for decentralisation design. Do the local-level 
governments have the capacity to perform the 
functions that have been decentralised to them? 
Can they mange the finances? Do they have the 
qualified personnel? If organisational capacity 
is weak then organisational performance will 
suffer and the promised gains of decentralisation 
will not materialise. There will be 
disillusionment with local-level government, 
perhaps government in general, and local 
support and trust of the formal institutions 
of government will decline, perhaps even 
disappear. Services will not be delivered 
efficiently or perhaps not at all. Thus, having 
good organisational capacity is a crucial 
requirement for an effective decentralisation 
program. It will not ensure effective 
decentralisation but it can make a vital 
contribution to it.
One of the most important ways in which 
organisational capacity can be improved is 
through training, but training can also be a way 
to waste resources. Poorly targeted training using 
irrelevant materials and taught by staff out of 
touch with the reality of local-level government 
is of no use to the populations of decentralised 
territories. Training needs to be directed to 
addressing identified problems in administration 
and the policy process. There should be 
priorities, both in terms of the subject matter 
and the personnel to be trained. Training 
requires coordination, and for Melanesia that 
means national government. Both appointed 
and elected officials at all levels can benefit 
from training. Curricula need constant review 
and updating. New demands should be addressed 
rapidly. Trainers need a range of pedagogical 
skills. None of this is new, but these known 
lessons have often been ignored. As a result, 
organisational capacity has suffered. Training 
is vulnerable to budgetary cutbacks as its 
practitioners and promoters rarely wield power 
in government. However, a system of training is 
vital for building and maintaining organisational 
capacity.
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CONCLUSION
This excursion into the design of 
decentralisation has not been exhaustive. 
The intention of the exercise has been to 
identify some of the leading questions which 
decentralisation architects must address when 
drawing up their designs. There are numerous 
additional questions, some of which will be 
specific to particular cases. Many of the 
questions posed in this paper have a managerial 
or technical focus but it would be self-deluding 
if decentralisation designers believed that 
they need only concern themselves with 
the mechanics of decentralisation. Their task 
has strong political components. Decisions 
concerning the configuration of central-local 
relations are the outcomes of political processes. 
Political management and risk analysis thus 
become important components of negotiated 
settlements. But powerful interests can influence 
decisions relating to the design of 
decentralisation so that bad rather than 
good governance prevails. It is mistaken to 
believe that everybody is in favour of good 
governance. There are individuals who occupy 
powerful positions who benefit greatly from bad 
governance and who may view decentralisation 
as an opportunity for accumulating more power 
and wealth or alternatively see an accountable 
democratic order as a threat to their current 
positions.
Two other matters that go beyond the 
technical are vital for decentralisation design. 
First, it is essential to understand the lessons 
of history. Too often history is overlooked 
or subjected to extraordinary interpretation. 
It should be mandatory to have a long and 
hard look at what systems have operated 
and what were their good and bad points. 
In some Melanesian countries the lack of 
historical investigation has proved calamitous 
for public sector reforms of all types. Secondly, 
decentralisation is not a matter of designing 
a blueprint which then acts as a straitjacket 
for central-local relations and the operation of 
local-level governance. What is needed is a 
clear framework within which there is room 
for manoeuvre. While some features of the 
system may need to be fixed, others may be 
negotiable thus giving appropriate consideration 
to local needs and aspirations. The danger 
is that designers may create blueprints which 
are unworkable from the start and which 
do little or nothing to achieve the stated 
objectives of decentralisation. Services remain 
poor, people have ‘voice’ but nobody listens and 
disillusionment prevails. Good decentralisation 
design processes which address fundamental 
questions and are fully aware of political realities 
can help to avoid such situations and lead to 
developmental gains. Furthermore, the initial 
design is only the first step, albeit a highly 
important one, in the process of decentralisation 
and the promotion of good governance at the 
local level.
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